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Abstract
Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) is a term used for the current dominant methodology for deciding what medical treatments 
should be accepted as valid. It places great emphasis on Randomised Clinical Trials (RCTs) which are analysed according to a strict 
frequentist paradigm, with a rigid p-value ≤0.05 criterion but with little consideration of prior probabilities or the cost of errors.
Accordingly, low cost, safe treatments where there is prior knowledge of at least slight effectiveness, may often be inappropriately 
discarded by EBM. The Cochrane Collaboration is an online central repository of RCTs and meta-analyses of RCTs. This paper uses 
statistical methods applied to a random sample of outcomes listed in the Cochrane Collaboration, to estimate the negative predictive 
value when treatments are declared ineffective as a result of positive outcomes which do not achieve the p≤ 0.05 criterion. The data 
were analysed using six different models in order to determine the proportion of genuinely ineffective treatments in the set of all 
positive outcomes where p>0.05. All six methods give point estimates substantially less than half for the negative predictive value 
when the decision rule is to declare treatments to be ineffective when their outcome is positive but p>0.05. Although confidence 
interval estimation indicates considerable uncertainty in these estimates, it seems reasonable to conclude that when a RCT gives a 
positive outcome but p>0.05, the conventional EBM decision to declare the treatment to be ineffective, is likely to be wrong more 
often than not.
Keywords: Evidence based medicine, false negatives, false non-discovery rate, low cost treatments, negative predictive value, statistical 
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Introduction
Whilst statistics and its application to medicine is a relatively 
modern discipline, its use as the fundamental arbiter of truth in 
medicine is much more recent still. The term “Evidence Based 
Medicine” (EBM) was coined in the early 1990s and with it came 
a paradigm shift in which evidence from human experiments - 
randomised controlled clinical trials (RCTs) - came to be regarded 
as the final arbiter of effective medical treatments. The birth of 
EBM was perhaps stimulated by the discovery of some important 
counterintuitive results. In particular, a statistical analysis was 
published of the effects of anti-arrhythmic drugs which had been 
advocated during heart attack because it was known that they 
suppressed minor heart irregularities. It was found that these 
drugs actually increased the risk of fatal disturbances of heart 
rhythm [1]. The interest in EBM with its increased emphasis on 
RCTs, may have also been related to the increase in the output 
of new pharmaceuticals and the corresponding increase in the 
need for objective assessments of drugs.
Prior to the early 1990s, decisions about which treatments 
were effective were made as a result of a combination of an 
understanding of mechanism where possible, expert opinion 
and experience, and by occasional RCTs. Experiences such as 
those with anti-arrhythmic drugs, prompted a pendulum swing 
towards greater reliance on RCTs, under the banner of EBM. EBM 
is now the current medical orthodoxy and indeed, challenging 
it can be seen as almost like challenging motherhood.
However, the EBM pendulum may have swung too far in overrating 
statistical evidence at the expense of all other kinds of evidence. 
In particular, EBM labels many treatments as having “no effect” 
when this conclusion is simply not plausible. Such a label may 
be applied to trials of additional checks and precautions which 
must logically be at least of some benefit in a small proportion of 
cases and may involve negligible costs. There are also examples 
where a low cost drug is known to alter physiology in a way 
which is almost certainly of at least slight benefit in a disease, 
but EBM will label the drug as having “no effect” for that disease. 
The “no effect” label is also used in implausible statements of 
the sort claiming a benefit for men but “no effect” for women, 
or benefit for those under 50 years of age but “no effect” on 
those over 50, or a benefit 3 months after treatment but “no 
effect” 6 months after the treatment. The term “no effect” is 
not just being used as an unfortunate abbreviation for “no 
statistically significant effect”, or, “no effect that could not be 
quite easily be explained by chance variation”. In this author’s 
reading of the medical literature, the term “no effect” is treated 
as a statement that is to be regarded as literally true, at least 
provisionally, pending any reassessment after some future 
RCT. A recent opinion piece in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association expressed similar concerns about the more 
nuanced expression “there is no evidence to suggest ” [2]. It is 
this author’s experience that most of the time in such situations 
where “no effect” is declared, reference to the original data will 
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reveal a small effect in the direction that would be expected.
A good example of an ultra low cost treatment which almost 
certainly has a worthwhile benefit overall in further reducing 
a small risk, is provided by skin cleaning. EBM proponents 
have argued that there is no need to clean the skin prior to 
minor procedures such as injections [3], despite 150 years of 
scientific knowledge regarding hygiene. The EBM enthusiasts 
make this argument simply because in the case of injections 
there are no RCTs which have resulted in a p-value ≤ 0.05 for 
skin cleaning and some relatively small uncontrolled trials with 
zero incidence of infection, so indicating “no evidence” for any 
benefit of hygiene in this case. In response to many such EBM 
pronouncements, the suggestion has been made that EBM 
proponents need to take part in a RCT of the effectiveness 
of parachutes in preventing trauma on descent from aircraft 
- as they deserved “to come down to earth with a bump” [4].
The issues here stem from a rigid approach by EBM in 
applying frequentist statistics, so that the size of Type I and 
II errors are arbitrarily fixed with little account being taken of 
prior knowledge or the cost of errors [5]. This is a particular 
concern when EBM is used to assess low cost treatments 
thought to avert low risk, high cost events as in skin cleaning 
preventing infections after injections. The need to assess 
low cost precautions against very low risk, very high cost 
situations, arises commonly in anaesthesia and to avoid the 
limitations of EBM in such situations, an alternative decision 
making paradigm is emerging [6].
Although there is no general agreement on exactly what 
constitutes EBM, there is now a formal evidence rating system 
[7], with the strongest rated evidence (Level 1 evidence) applied 
 to treatments that show “significant” results in multiple RCTs. 
“Significant” is defined in terms of obtaining a p-value ≤ 0.05. 
Prior knowledge such as mechanism-based reasoning does 
not rate a mention as a form of evidence about a treatment, 
except when there is no statistical evidence [7]. When 
physiological or mechanism-based reasoning or commonsense 
and expert opinion are the sole basis for a positive assessment 
of a treatment, the evidence is defined to be at the lowest 
level (Level 5 evidence), so the parachute parody [4] does 
not appear to have had much impact on EBM.  Bayesian 
methods to allow for prior knowledge and decision theory 
to take account of the cost of errors, are in practice little used 
in the assessment of most treatments even though Bayesian 
methods in medicine is a field of active research. In EBM the 
term “significant” is virtually synonymous with obtaining a 
p-value ≤0.05. Obtaining p>0.05 for a treatment in an RCT is 
taken to mean that, at least for the time being, the treatment 
is to be regarded as ineffective.
There has been some move to go beyond simple inspection 
of p-values to make a decision about a treatment. In particular, 
there is encouragement to define a clinically significant 
benefit and fix a reasonable level of Type II error. Additionally, 
the CONSORT statement [8] encourages the use of 95% 
confidence intervals as well as p-values in summarising the 
result of a statistical analysis so that studies with narrower 
confidence intervals can be favoured in terms of level of 
evidence. The CONSORT statement also suggests that it may 
be appropriate to consider the confidence interval as a range 
of values compatible with the size of the treatment effect, even 
when the confidence interval includes the zero effect value. 
This author would have preferred to see CONSORT replace 
the word “compatible” in the preceding sentence by a term 
such as “easily compatible”, but nevertheless, it is positive 
to see acknowledgement within EBM that a confidence 
interval which includes zero, does not necessarily equate 
with “no effect”. However, in most medical literature, if the 
95% confidence interval includes zero treatment effect or 
equivalently the p-value is >0.05 the treatment is assessed, 
at least provisionally, as worthless. Writing ten years ago in 
the first issue of the general statistical interest magazine 
“Significance”, a consultant medical statistician commented 
that medical researchers were only interested in “p-values ... 
less than 0.05” [9]. Unfortunately it is this author’s perception 
working both as a part time general practitioner and part time 
statistical consultant, that the enthusiasm for p-values as the 
sole criterion in medical decision making has not changed. 
There is a myriad of disease management summaries that this 
author, working as a general practitioner, receives to assist 
in continuing professional development, where almost all 
advice as to which treatments should be assumed to work 
seems based solely on p-values.
The cost of errors are not explicitly taken into account by 
EBM. However, the cost of Type II errors is to some degree, 
implicitly considered when the size of this error is set. Whilst 
the setting of the Type II error rate is less ossified than is the 
case with the p≤0.05 criterion, a common requirement is that 
the Type II error rate be=0.2. However, specification of the Type 
II error rate also implies a requirement to specify a minimum 
size of effect that is clinically significant [8] though this is not 
the only approach to balancing errors and effect size [10,11]. 
Unfortunately, much of the time it is not possible to objectively 
specify a size of effect that is just clinically significant. Often 
the size of the effect that is clinically significant in a real sense, 
the minimum clinically important difference, will imply a 
requirement for trials that are too large to be feasible. For 
example, most cancer patients given the choice of two 
almost equal cost chemotherapy regimes, one of which has 
a 50% chance of saving their life and the other which has 
a 51% chance, will have a definite preference for the latter. 
For them, a 1% extra chance of life is “clinically significant”. A 
trial to detect this 1% difference for a particular cancer at a 
particular stage, with the Type I error rate set at 0.05 and the 
Type II error rate set at 0.20, would require 78,000 participants 
and certainly not be feasible. Likewise, whilst patients may 
accept their doctor’s bland reassurance based on EBM, that 
cleaning the skin prior to an injection has “no effect” on the 
chance of a serious infection, they might baulk at the idea of 
a doctor declining to use an alcohol wipe, if the risk that could 
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be averted by use of an alcohol wipe was explained as the risk 
of a month or so commuting on the roads. (A risk of the order 
of 1 in 100,000 was suggested in the discussion following the 
paper on EBM and the issue of skin cleaning for injections 
[3]). A patient might then ask “How many alcohol wipes are 
worth my life?”. However, a RCT to prove the risk of not using 
an alcohol wipe was appreciably smaller than the risk of a 
month’s commuting, would require even greater numbers 
of participants than in the previous cancer trial scenario. 
The EBM solution to this difficulty amounts to redefining 
the term “clinically significant”. In a paper giving instructions 
on the statistics of so called non-inferiority trials, it is clearly 
indicated that in the cancer survival scenario above, a 10% 
decline in survival or even a halving of the cure rate could be 
regarded as “non-inferior”, simply by reinterpreting the term 
“clinically significant” to mean little more than “detectable by 
a trial of feasible size” [12].
The discussion above suggests that EBM is too ready to 
dismiss low cost treatments that are likely to have a worthwhile, 
albeit less than dramatic, effect. RCTs of many such treatments 
may be declared to be negative, when a small positive effect 
may be apparent in the outcomes of such RCTs. This may occur 
too often for one to reasonably believe the excess of trials 
with weakly positive outcomes are due to chance. This paper 
assesses the false non-discovery rate of EBM using the methods 
of EBM, frequentist statistics, together with six different 
models or sets of assumptions, about the distribution of the 
effectiveness of interventions. In particular, for each model, 
estimates are obtained of the negative predictive value of 
declaring a treatment ineffective conditional on a weakly 
positive outcome. More precisely, this paper is concerned with:-
In the remainder of this paper the term “(conditional) negative 
predictive value” may be used for brevity, without specifying 
the conditionality.
The selection of a random list of RCTs is facilitated by the 
existence of an online encyclopaedic compilation of EBM 
analyses known as the Cochrane Collaboration. Considerable 
care is taken in the Cochrane database to include all relevant 
data and so minimize bias towards trials which give particular 
outcomes, such as positive outcomes. A random selection of 
point estimates with confidence intervals was chosen from 
topics across the Cochrane Collaboration. These estimates, 
regarded as data points, are then analysed by six different 
models.
Methods
Randomisation
Data was obtained over the internet from the Cochrane 
Collaboration [13] during the first quarter of 2013. The 
Cochrane Collaboration is organised in a tree like structure 
with headings or main branches, subheadings or secondary 
branches and sub-subheadings etc, leading to links to the 
abstracts that may contain summary statistics either from 
meta-analyses or analyses of individual RCTs. These abstracts 
constitute a major reference database for EBM. The Cochrane 
Collaboration’s decision about whether a particular treatment 
is effective is based largely on the statistical point estimates 
and confidence intervals in these abstracts. To ensure an 
unbiased sample of the statistical results in the Cochrane 
Collaboration, a portable random number generator [14] was 
used to steer a path through to an individual quantitative 
result in an abstract. The random number generator is seeded 
by an initial integer which then determines a sequence of 
pseudo-random numbers between 0 and 1. In each search 
for an individual quantitative result, consecutive numbers 
from this sequence were used at each level of the Cochrane 
Collaboration branching tree to determine which of the 
branches to follow. For example, if at the thk  level there were 
10 branches, the branch chosen would be the 
thn +1 of the 
branches listed at that level where n was the first decimal 
of the thk random number in the sequence. If on arrival at 
an abstract there was more than one point estimate with a 
confidence interval, the next number in the sequence was used 
to choose one of the estimates. A particular random path to 
a single quantitative result is then determined by providing 
the random number generator with a particular seed. Some 
pathways led to abstracts which did not contain suitable 
quantitative results. In those cases the random number calling 
program was restarted with a new seed. Ultimately seeding 
integers 1 to 248 were used to obtain 100 point estimates 
together with their confidence intervals.
Exclusions
There were 148 abstracts that were not used. These abstracts 
were excluded for the following reasons:
1. Most of the excluded abstracts simply did not contain 
    any quantitative data. Indeed, many of these abstracts did 
   no more than state that a meta-analysis had been 
   attempted, but the attempt failed because there were 
   no suitable RCTs on the topic to be reviewed.
2. Abstracts that gave point estimates but not confidence 
    intervals were also excluded. 
3. Abstracts that reviewed new drugs under patent were 
    excluded, partly because of concern that commercial 
   pressures through publication bias or other means 
   might lead to distortions that would differ from those 
   where commercial pressures were not involved [15]. 
    Excluding costly new drugs, also allows this paper to give 
    more weight to the question of how often EBM erroneously 
    rejects low cost treatments. However, abstracts evaluating 
   new drugs make up only a small proportion of the 
   Cochrane database.
4. Generally an RCT will compare the effects of a standard 
    treatment against the effects of a standard treatment 
    plus an extra treatment which it is hoped may be beneficial. 
   Whilst there is an implied suggestion that the extra 
P(treatment ineffective | outcome of trial positive but p>0.05)
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 treatment may be beneficial, it may turn out to be useless 
 or (hopefully rarely) counterproductive. However, some 
 RCTs are of a different form and compare mutually exclusive 
 treatments where there is no suggestion of superiority of 
 one or the other. Data were excluded if there was no 
 implied suggestion that a treatment was being assessed 
 that may be superior to an existing standard treatment. 
 Whether a suggestion was implied about the possible 
 superiority of a treatment, was determined by the author’s 
 commonsense informed by the background material in the 
 abstract and by the author’s general knowledge as a medical 
 doctor. However, it is likely that commonsense alone, 
 without specialised medical knowledge, would nearly 
 always have led to the same conclusion. In a few cases the 
 implied suggestion was that the new treatment might be 
 inferior. For example, there were trials to see if non specialist 
 surgeons could be as successful in some areas as specialist 
 surgeons, where the existing standard of treatment was 
 treatment by a specialist surgeon. In such cases the outcome 
 was treated as though there was an implied suggestion 
 of possible superiority for the existing standard.
5. Abstracts were excluded if there were mistakes or “typos” 
     which made the quantitative information indecipherable. 
    For example, there was an instance where the quoted 
    confidence interval did not contain the point estimate 
    and the correct values remained unresolved after 
    examination of the full Cochrane review article [16]. 
6. It was assumed that in the case of differences in 
    continuous quantities, the confidence interval would 
    be symmetrically distributed about the point estimate. 
    In the case of odds ratios, relative risks and hazard rates 
    it was assumed that the log of the confidence interval 
    end points would be symmetrically distributed about 
    the log of the point estimate. This was checked and the 
     data was not included if, to within rounding error, the (log) 
    point estimate was not in the middle of the (log) 
    confidence interval. Only one data point, involving a 
    Peto odds ratio, was rejected on this basis. However, 
     for the purposes of the first, second, third and fifth models, 
     data was included in two cases where an odds ratio or the 
    end point of a confidence interval of an odds ratio, 
     included the value zero. In these two cases, information 
    was obtained from the body of the Cochrane review to 
    enable the point estimate to be matched to a value from 
    a standard normal distribution in terms of equal p-value. 
7. Where abstracts contained more than one point estimate 
    with confidence intervals, the data was excluded from 
     randomisation if it referred to issues such as side effects 
    of a treatment rather than to the main purpose of a  
    treatment.
8. Finally abstracts were rejected from further consideration 
    if a previous random path had led to the same abstract. 
    In other words, the random sampling of the Cochrane 
     Collaboration was performed in a non-replacement mode.
It may be noted that although the process used to select a 
statistic is random with virtually no possibility of subjective 
judgement being allowed to distort the selection process, the 
statistics selected, whilst unbiased by this author’s personal 
preference, may not be fully representative of the statistics 
recorded in the Cochrane Collaboration. In particular, if we 
regard the individual statistics as leaves on a tree, those leaves 
whose connection to the trunk bear fewer leaves, have more 
chance of being selected.
Data preprocessing
In the case of continuous data, the amount of effect was 
rearranged if necessary so that the implied a priori suggestion 
about the effect of the treatment was assigned a positive 
number if a desirable effect was found and vice versa. For 
example, if a weight loss treatment resulted in an average 
change in weight of -2kg for the treatment group in comparison 
to the controls, this value would be recorded as a “+2”.
In the case of odds ratios and relative risks and rates, data 
was rearranged if necessary, so that the implied a priori 
suggestion about the effect of the treatment was assigned a 
value greater than 1 if the effect was desirable. For example, if 
a treatment for a relapsing disease reduced the rate of relapse 
by 50%, the relative rate change would be recorded as 2.00 
with of course the corresponding treatment for the limits of 
the confidence intervals. Log transforms were taken of all 
odds ratios, relative risks and rates prior to analysis.
The 100 values obtained along with their confidence intervals, 
give information about the size of an effect and the accuracy 
with which it has been assessed. However, across these 100 
values it is not possible to compare size of effects because 
continuous data is dependent on the unit of measurement. 
On the other hand, odds ratios, relative risks and rates can be 
compared on an absolute scale, so for example a treatment 
which halves the mortality of newborns, can be regarded as 
equally efficacious in quantitative terms as a treatment which 
doubles the odds of someone successfully giving up smoking.
To enable an analysis which could include together both 
continuous data and data on relative rates and ratios in a way 
that is not dependent on unit of measurement, it is necessary 
to sacrifice the information on accuracy and retain only 
information on size of effect, by expressing all data in terms of 
standard deviations from zero effect. This is done by dividing 
the size of the effect by the standard error as determined 
by the width of the confidence interval to give a t-statistic. 
For simplicity, throughout this paper, it is assumed that the 
statistics that are being sampled, have emerged from RCTs or 
meta-analyses where the numbers involved are sufficient for 
an approximation by the normal distribution. The data used 
in models 1, 2, 3 and 5 are the 100 sizes of effect as measured 
in standard deviations. Models 1 and 2 use all data points, 
but models 3 and 5 which assume an underlying normal 
distribution, neglect a single outlier.
In these models, information on precision is combined with 
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amount of effect, into a single measure of “size” as measured 
in standard deviations. In a sense, this amounts to throwing 
away some of the information collected. In addition, the 
“size” that is used, is not the size of an effect, but the size of 
how convincingly an effect has been assessed. There may be 
disparate motives in such an assessment. In particular, those 
researching treatments in orthodox medicine may prefer to 
economise in terms of the number of subjects employed 
and so not demonstrate the size of the effect so convincingly. 
On the other hand researchers studying unlikely treatments 
that happen to be effective, may want to demonstrate their 
effectiveness to a much higher degree of certainty.
The issues here can be avoided if attention is focussed on 
relative risks and odds and hazard ratios where there is an 
absolute scale. In these situations, information about how 
big the effect is can be used separately from the measure 
of how accurately it has been measured. Models 4 and 6 are 
then confined to these types of measures omitting 28 cases 
involving continuous data. Two data points concerning odds 
ratios that involved the value 0 are also omitted, as such values 
were incompatible with normality assumptions required of 
the log of the data values. In effect, two outliers are being 
discarded. There were then 70 data points with accompanying 
confidence intervals for models 4 and 6.
Calculations
All computer calculations were performed using Fortran with 
the assistance of standard algorithms [14]. More complex 
calculations were checked by alternative methods where 
practical. In particular, some calculations using the EM 
algorithm [17] were checked using Nelder and Mead’s simplex 
method to find maximum likelihood estimates. Some results 
were also checked by simulation methods.
First model
Model description
The first model assumes that treatments are of two sorts - 
effective treatments and treatments that are genuinely useless 
and whose effect sizes will therefore be scattered around zero. 
The number of genuinely useless treatments giving weakly 
negative results will tend to approximate the number of 
genuinely useless treatments giving weakly positive results, 
so if all effective treatments gave strongly positive results, the 
ratio of the weakly negative to weakly positive results will be 
around 1. Here it is linguistically convenient to use the term 
“weakly positive” to refer to a positive result with a p-value 
> 0.05 with “weakly negative” defined likewise. However, in 
practice the weakly positive results will also include some of 
the outcomes of genuinely effective treatments. The number 
of weakly negative outcomes can then be used as an estimate 
of the number of genuinely useless treatments in the set of 
all weakly positive outcomes. The ratio of the weakly negative 
outcomes to the weakly positive outcomes is then an estimate 
of the genuinely useless treatments as a proportion of all the 
weakly positive treatments. In other words this ratio gives an 
estimate of the (conditional) negative predictive value. This 
first model has an advantage in terms of simplicity. It has 
disadvantages in that it ignores the possibility of perverse 
chance resulting in a few of the genuinely effective treatments 
actually giving weakly negative outcomes. It also ignores the 
possibility of genuinely counterproductive treatments. It is 
also noted that the estimate here of the negative predictive 
value involves estimating a ratio of random quantities, and 
estimation methods can do better than taking the crude ratio 
of the point estimates [18]. However, preliminary calculations 
show that such corrections here are orders of magnitude 
smaller than other sources of error, so such refinements are 
not pursued.
Model 1 results
Of the 100 outcomes there were 2 outcomes that seemed 
convincingly counterproductive (outcomes < -1.96 standard 
deviations), there were 8 values in the range (-1.96, 0), there 
was 1 value of exactly 0 and 23 values in the range (0, +1.96). 
The overall pattern is illustrated in Figure 1. In forming the ratio 
of weakly negatives to weakly positives, the single value 0 
was counted as an additional 0.5 of a value in both numerator 
and denominator. The ratio of weakly negative to weakly 
positive treatments then gives the negative predictive value 
to be                           . Confidence intervals for the (conditional) 
negative predictive value of declaring treatments that yield 
outcomes in the (0, +1.96) standard deviation range to be 
ineffective, are obtained by bootstrapping. All confidence 
intervals quoted in this paper are bootstrap confidence 
intervals based on resampling from the data to produce 
10,000 sets of the relevant data points. The result is a 95% 
confidence interval of (13.7% , 71.4%).
Second Model
It is common to require clinical trials to be designed to have 
a Type II error rate of 20%. This specification requires some 
preliminary estimate of the variability in the quantity to be 
measured, some decision about the size of the effect that is 
to be detected and then adjustment of the numbers in the 
trial accordingly. In practice, the actual Type II error rate will 
differ from this specification as the variability in the system 
and the actual effect size will likely differ from the values used 
in planning. Furthermore, not all clinical trials will specify a 
Type II error rate of 20%. However, for the purposes of this 
second model, it is assumed that all outcomes of effective 
treatments are normally distributed and subject to a Type II 
error rate of 20%, so effective treatments, measured in standard 
deviations, are distributed as N(1.96+0.842, 12). It is further 
assumed that all other treatments are entirely ineffective and 
their outcomes are distributed as a standard normal random 
variable. If q is the proportion of ineffective treatments then 
the proportion of treatments above 1.96 standard deviations 
8.5
23.5
» 36.2%≈ 36.2% 
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=0.8(1-q)+0.025q. Between 0 and 1.96 standard deviations the 
proportion will be 0.1974(1-q)+0.475q and 0.0026(1-q)+0.5q 
will be less than zero. q is then chosen to minimize the chi 
square sum difference between the expected and observed 
proportions. The (conditional) negative predictive value is then
 
The minimum chi-squared estimate of q is 19.4%. With this 
estimate, the model gives a good fit to the data with a       
p-value of 0.71:
The negative predictive value point estimate is 36.7% with 
95% bootstrap confidence interval of (21.5%, 50.4%).
Third Model
The third model assumes that each treatment has an intrinsic 
effectiveness that is chosen from some fixed unknown 
distribution and that chance factors from the clinical trial 
are added to this intrinsic effectiveness to result in the actual 
outcome. A model of the distribution of outcomes is required 
that is a reasonable match to the data depicted in Figure 1. 
One value was clearly an outlier (This value related to the 
effectiveness of a Chinese herb on viral myocarditis and 
the effect of this herb had been demonstrated, far, far more 
convincingly than any other of the 99 effects examined). This 
outlier was dropped for the purposes of the curve fitting. The 
remaining 99 values appear in Figure 1 to be compatible with 
the assumption of a normal distribution. We then assume 
that each treatment has an underlying effectiveness chosen 
from the distribution                               and that to this intrinsic 
effectiveness, normally distributed random effects are added. 
The result is then normally distributed. Since the sizes of the 
effects are measured in standard deviations, the uncertainties 
added by the clinical trials are normally distributed with a 
standard deviation of 1 and are denoted by                            The 
outcomes of trials of disparate treatments is then distributed 
as                                            . The parameters μ  and                         are 
then estimated by curve fitting.
Of most interest is the negative predictive value given 
that the outcome is in the range (0, 1.96) standard deviations. 
Since in this model we make the (unrealistic) assumption that 
treatments with precisely no effectiveness have zero probability, 
then the only treatments which would be correctly rejected 
are those having negative intrinsic effectiveness. Since our 
negative predictive value calculation is conditional on weakly 
positive outcomes, what we are interested in is:-
 To evaluate this we require the numerator
)1(1974.0475.0
475.0
qq
q
−+
χ12
<0 0 to 1.96 >1.96
Observed 10.5 23.5 66
Expected 9.92 25.13 64.95
Y ~ N(0,12 )
Figure 1. Histogram of all results as measured in standard 
deviations, together with a curve giving the density of the 
mixture distribution y=0.02 ϕ(x,0,12) + 0.98 ϕ(x,2.66, 2.152). 
The numerical values used here are described in the results of 
the fifth model.
P(intrinsic effectiveness ≤0 | outcome є (0,1.96))
and the denominator, P(outcome є (0,1.96)) In particular, for 
the numerator we want                                                   . 
This is then
To proceed we note that in general if                      and 
independently                       then the deconvolution distri-
bution of X given X+Y can be obtained by making the change 
of variable U=X+Y in the joint density function fXY and then 
dividing by fU . We obtain the distribution of
Here                ,                and                                                                  
so here                                                                  where Φ  is the 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable.
The proportion of outcomes giving values in the 0 to 1.96 
range, which are appropriately rejected as negative because 
they are counterproductive then is 
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where ϕ(u, μ, σ2) is the normal density function of X + Y. 
This is then the numerator of the negative predictive value. 
The denominator is 
The parameter estimates and results of the negative predictive 
value calculation are given in the table below:
The calculations here are checked by simulation. A million 
values of                          and                         are generated 
using the parameter point estimates above. A count is then 
kept of the instances in which             with                             . 
This gives the numerator of the (conditional) negative 
predictive value with the denominator being counted similarly. 
The negative predictive value by simulation is 7.75%.
Fourth Model
Model description
This model uses the subset of the original data where outcomes 
are relative risks and odds and hazard ratios. The distribution 
of the 70 values that comprise this data is displayed in Figure 2. 
Again it is assumed that the underlying effectiveness of 
treatments is distributed as                        , though this assu-
mption is modified later. To this underlying distribution of 
effect size, additional variability is added due to the limited 
accuracy of any clinical trial, so if the ith data point has a 
confidence interval indicating a variance of 2iσ , then we 
consider that the outcome is a point from a                              
distribution. The collection of all such outcomes would be 
values from  a mixture distribution with 70 components. For 
curve fitting purposes, we appeal to the central limit theorem 
and assume that the distribution of outcomes can be 
reasonably approximated by an )ˆ,( 22 σσµ +N  distribution 
where 2σ  is the average of the 2iσ . An estimate of µ and 
2σˆ  is then obtained by fitting this distribution to the data.
To obtain the negative predictive value when 
treatments are declared ineffective, though their results 
are in the range (0, 1.96) standard deviations, we return 
to regarding the outcomes as coming from 70 separate 
distributions )ˆ,( ~ 22 ii NYX σσµ ++ . Using reasoning 
analogous to that used in the third model, we require 
                                                               which in the model can be 
calculated as 
1.96 2
0
ˆ
ˆ ( , , )
u
u du
µ σ
σ ϕ µ σ
σ
 + 
Φ − × 
 
 
∫
2 2ˆ( , )iN µ σ σ+
Figure 2. Histogram of logarithms of the relative risk, rate and  
ratio data, together with the mixture distribution 
y=0.192ϕ(x,0, 0.07892 )+ 0.808ϕ(x,0.734, 0.6862) where the 
numerical values used here are calculated as described in the 
sixth model.
The estimated value of the numerator is the sum of 70 such 
integrals, each modelling an outcome to do with one value iu .
The estimated value of the denominator is the sum of 70 
values of the probability P(X+Yi є (0, 1.96 σi)). Each of these 
can be evaluated as 
The negative predictive value (conditional on weakly positive 
results) is then the estimated numerator over this estimated 
denominator.
Model 4 results
The parameter estimates and results of the negative predictive 
value calculation are given in the table below:
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parameter Point estimate 95% confidence interval
2.61 2.18 3.04
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Neg pred val 7.81% 4.50% 10.35%
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μ
parameter Point estimate 95% confidence interval
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The calculations here were checked by simulating a data set 
of 1,000,000 values where each value was determined by 
random numbers with the distributions assumed in the 
model and parameters estimated from the real data set. In 
this data set, as the simulated values are generated a count 
is made of the instances for which X + Yi є (0, 1.96σi) with X < 0 and compared with  the numerator in the previously 
described parametric calculation. A check of the denominator 
is performed similarly. This simulation then gives a (conditional) 
negative predictive value of 7.85%.
Fifth model
Model description
An obvious oversimplification in the third and fourth model 
is the assumption that all treatments have some intrinsic 
effectiveness, mostly positive but occasionally negative. It 
would seem to be much more realistic to assume that a 
proportion, say q, of the treatments are in fact entirely useless 
whereas the remaining proportion 1-q have a distribution 
of effectiveness, with the distribution being mostly positive 
although occasionally treatments will be counterproductive. 
We again assume normality for the effective treatments. The 
overall distribution of the effectiveness of the treatments is 
then a mixture distribution )ˆ,()1()0( 2σµδ Nqq ×−+×  
where )0(δ is the Dirac delta function. To this underlying 
distribution, extra noise of the form )1,0( 2N is added, 
accounting for the random outcome about the true value 
given by a clinical trial, when outcomes are measured 
in standard deviations. The resulting distribution is then 
)1ˆ,()1()1,0( 222 +×−+× σµNqNq  The EM algorithm 
was then used on the data to estimate the three parameters 
of this mixture distribution - the proportion of the data 
corresponding to entirely ineffective treatments, and the 
mean and standard deviation 2ˆ 1σ σ= +  of the outcomes 
which had a definite effect (mostly positive, but occasionally 
negative).
Again estimates of these parameters were used to calculate 
the negative predictive value given that the outcome was in the 
0 to 1.96 standard deviation range. Using the same reasoning 
as in model 3, but incorporating the extra assumption of the 
mixture distribution, the expected value of the numerator of 
the negative predictive value calculation in this model becomes
  
The number 0.475 here refers to the proportion from a standard 
normal that is in the range (0, 1.96).
Similarly the denominator is 
Model 5 results
The data for all 100 points is displayed in Figure 1 together 
with the mixture distribution fitted by the EM algorithm to 
the 99 points excluding the outlier. A Shapiro Wilks test shows 
that the overall distribution could quite easily be regarded 
as a single Gaussian normal (p=0.321). However, the best 
fitting mixture distribution suggests a slight bulge in the 
histogram near zero.
The parameter estimates and results of the (conditional) 
negative predictive value calculation are given in the table 
below:
The fact that the lower end of the confidence interval for q 
includes zero, reflects the fact that an appreciable number of 
the bootstrap selections give data that the EM algorithm fits 
with a single Gaussian distribution, a result compatible with 
the previously quoted Shapiro-Wilks test showing that the 
data can quite easily be fitted with a single normal distribution.
A simulation of a million values for X and Y gave a simulated 
point estimate of the negative predictive value of 10.9% 
Sixth model
This model extends the fourth model. It is again confined 
to the 70 outcomes that involved relative rates and ratios. 
However we now use the extra assumption that we are 
dealing with a mixture distribution representing treatments 
which are entirely useless together with treatments whose 
effectiveness is drawn from some underlying normal 
distribution. The underlying distribution of the treatments 
is then )ˆ,()1()0( 2σµδ Nqq ×−+× . For each treatment, 
randomness in the outcome of the form ),0( 2iN σ  is added.
The overall distribution is the average of 70 mixture 
distributions each with one normal component centred on 0 and 
the other on µ . We again appeal to the central limit theorem 
and assume that the outcomes as a whole are drawn from the 
distribution ),()1(),0( 2effective
2
eineffectiv σµσ NqNq ×−+×  
This is used for curve fitting purposes.
The EM algorithm gives q as an estimate of the overall 
proportion of the first component, but also gives an individual 
weight iw  for the probability of a given data point coming 
from the first component. The distribution for a single outcome 
is then )ˆ,()1(),0( 222 iiii NwNw σσµσ +×−+×   and 
the overall distribution is the average of 70 such distributions.
It can then be seen that     
1.96 2
0
ˆ
ˆ0.475 (1 ) ( , , )
u
q q u du
µ σ
σ ϕ µ σ
σ
 + 
× + − × Φ − × 
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parameter Point estimate 95% confidence interval
q 0.0205 0.000 0.187
2.66 2.27 3.26
2.15 1.74 2.44
Neg pred val 10.7% 4.8% 31.9%
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and                                                                
 
allowing σˆ  to be estimated.
Using the reasoning given in model 5 and model 4, we 
have the negative predictive value given an outcome in the 
range (0, 1.96σi) is 
where iN  and iD  are defined in equations (1) and (2) of 
model 4.
Model 6 results
The logarithm of the data for the 70 odds ratios, relative risks 
and rates is displayed in Figure 2 together with the mixture 
distribution fitted by the EM algorithm to these 70 points. A 
Shapiro Wilks test shows that the overall distribution could 
not easily be regarded as a single Gaussian normal (p=0.028) 
and the mixture distribution described above is fitted.
The parameter estimates and results of the negative predictive 
value calculation are given in the table below:
A simulation with the parameter values above, was used to 
check the point estimate for the negative predictive value. 
Using 70 million simulated values obtained from the set of 
70 equations )ˆ,()1(),0( 222 iiii NwNw σσµσ +×−+×  
the simulated negative predictive value is 30.9%.
Result summary
It is helpful to summarise the various estimates we have for 
the negative predictive value of a treatment being correctly 
labelled as ineffective conditional on there being a positive 
outcome but with a p-value >0.05. In assessing these figures, 
it should be noted that models 1 and 2 are based on 100 
data points, models 3 and 5 are based on 99 data points and 
models 4 and 6 are based on 70 pairs of data points, with each 
pair giving a point estimate and a measure of variability. It 
should also be noted that models 1 and 2 do not exclude any 
outlier, models 3 and 5 exclude one outlier and models 4 and 
6 implicitly exclude two outliers. Models 3 and 4 exclude the 
possibility of treatments being purely useless.
It is important to note that all the point estimates of the 
negative predictive value are considerably less than 50%. This 
tells us that when EBM declares a treatment to be ineffective 
despite an outcome in an RCT being positive (albeit not 
convincingly so in terms of p≤0.05 then EBM is likely to 
be wrong more often than not. The bootstrap confidence 
intervals however show there is considerable uncertainty 
about the estimates. 
Discussion
Alternative interpretations of the data
The models here basically assume that the difference between 
the proportion of weak positive values and weak negative 
values is explained by effective treatments giving unconvincing 
results. A possible alternative explanation is a form of 
publication bias that applies within the subset of all RCTs 
which show weak results and differentiates between RCTs that 
show weak positive and weak negative outcomes. There are 
various estimates of the extent of publication bias when the 
contrast is between results that are “statistically significant” 
and those which are not and where commercial pressures 
may not be excluded. A median estimate is a ratio of 2.3 [19]. 
One would expect the extent of publication bias to be much 
smaller between weakly positive or negative studies for which 
the conclusion either way is “no effect” and so it seems unlikely 
that publication bias would account for the almost 3-fold 
difference between weak positive studies and weak negative 
studies seen here. Indeed one could speculate on whether 
any tendency to publish results which are slightly perverse 
would balance out a tendency to publish weak results in the 
other direction. It seems more likely that most of the 3-fold 
difference is accounted for by Type II error. If so, provisionally 
labelling treatments as having “no effect”, when outcomes are 
weakly positive would seem to be an inappropriate practice, 
at least when the treatments are low cost and when there 
are prior reasons to expect them to be effective.
Limitations of the models and their implications for 
the results 
Model 1 implicitly assumes that chance effects will result in 
treatments which are truly positive, contaminating the set of 
weakly negative outcomes to the same extent as treatments 
which are truly negative contaminate the set of weakly 
positive outcomes. Since truly positive treatments almost 
70
1
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1
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i i ii
i i ii
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w w D
=
=
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∑
parameter Point estimate 95% confidence interval
q 0.192 0.003 0.441
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Model Point estimate 95% confidence interval
1 36.2% 13.7% 71.4%
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certainly outnumber the truly negative, it can be seen that 
this will lead to the model overestimating the (conditional) 
negative predictive value.
In model 2, if we assumed that the effective treatments 
were somewhat less effective than the 80% power assumption 
implies, it can be seen that the three compartments into which 
results are classified (outcomes <0, outcomes ∈(0,1.96 standard 
deviations) and outcomes >1.96, could then be best fitted 
by taking q=0. The implication is that if power is consistently 
overestimated then this model will overestimate the 
(conditional) negative predictive value. The converse is also 
true. However, the introductory comments in this paper are 
relevant here - the desirability of detecting small effects 
may be ignored because that would require trials that are 
infeasibly large. Since this suggests that power tends to be 
overestimated, the implication for model 2 is that it is more 
likely that the q here is overestimated so that the (conditional) 
negative predictive value is in turn overestimated.
Models 3 to 6 simplify by assuming normal distributions. 
It is reasonable to believe that there will be some treatments 
trialled that will be precisely useless and where chance effects 
will yield results normally distributed about zero. On the 
other hand, there is no compelling reason to believe that 
the central limit theorem will apply to disparate treatments 
that do have some effect, so as to make their outcomes fit a 
normal distribution and there is no reason to assume a normal 
distribution for the totality of treatment effects. However, the 
errors caused by such simplifying assumptions may be reduced 
because it is only the region around the weak positive portion 
of the distribution of outcomes that is most relevant to the 
calculations. Models 3 and 4 on the one hand and models 
5 and 6 on the other, can be seen as representing extremes 
of a reasonable range of options in this region. In models 3 
and 4 smoothness is assumed around the zero effectiveness 
mark whereas in models 5 and 6 this part of the distribution 
is interrupted with a delta spike degraded by uncertainties 
in measurement. Models 3 and 4 give lower estimates of 
the proportion of useless treatments than models 5 and 
6 because the latter allow for a treatment to be useless in 
two ways - either because they are counterproductive or 
because they are purely ineffective whereas models 3 and 4 
reject treatments only to the extent that they are assessed 
as genuinely counterproductive. Since it may be conjectured 
that there will be an appreciable proportion of treatments 
which have just a minimal positive effect (which perhaps 
would still be worthwhile if these treatments were very low 
cost), the true negative predictive value may lie between the 
two extremes represented by models 3 and 4 on the one hand 
and models 5 and 6 on the other hand. In other words, it may 
be reasonable to expect that the true answer lies between 
the values suggested by these two sets of models. 
We see then, that for models 1, 2, 5 and 6, the estimates of 
the (conditional) negative predictive value may be too high, 
whereas for models 3 and 4 the estimates may be too low. 
Model extensions
This work could be extended to avoid the parametric assumption 
of a Gaussian mixture model and instead use numerical 
methods applied to the actual distribution of the outcomes. 
We have in effect a deconvolution problem, where we have 
a “blurring” function added to the intrinsic effectiveness of 
each treatment to give the pattern of outcomes. A unique 
solution to the underlying distribution of the effectiveness 
of the treatments could perhaps be obtained by constraining 
this distribution to be smooth in some way. This approach is 
likely to be involved and is likely to require much more data 
for reasonable accuracy. It will not be pursued here.
Bayes’ theorem together with the models, could be used 
to calculate the negative predictive value as a function of 
the outcome in terms of the standard deviations from zero. 
Given the wide confidence intervals already obtained, such 
an approach does not seem warranted without more data. 
 
Implications for EBM
Considerable attention has been paid to the problem of false 
positives in EBM, the inappropriate acceptance of treatments 
that later turn out to be ineffective. Publication bias due to 
a preference for positive results is always an issue, but is a 
particular problem when there are commercial pressures 
concerning new drugs under patent [15]. Publication bias 
is also relevant together with a regression to the mean 
effect, when out of a set of many novel treatments, a few are 
unduly accepted because of promising initial results which 
are not backed up by later assessments [20]. There has been 
considerable research into publication bias as a source of 
undue type I errors and there are quantitative methods based 
on analysis of funnel plots to assess this [21]. There is even a 
Cochrane Collaboration study on publication bias in studies of 
publication bias [19]. However, there seems to have been less 
attention paid to the converse problem of false negatives - in 
particular, the inappropriate rejection of low cost treatments 
that external considerations indicate must have some, albeit 
slight, effect, but which are labelled by EBM as having “no 
effect”. Whilst concerns about this converse problem have 
been expressed [2,4,5], this author is not aware of any previous 
quantitative analysis of this problem.
The undervaluing by EBM of prior knowledge from biological 
science or commonsense and lack of accounting for the cost 
of errors, particularly Type II errors, makes one very suspicious 
of the “no effect” label. In nearly all cases the bland statement 
that the treatment showed “no effect”, will be false if taken 
in a precise literal sense. It is noted that for only 1 out of 
100 trials selected as data here, was it literally true that the 
outcome showed no effect. As well as being false in a precise 
literal sense, this paper shows that the pronouncement “no 
effect” is false in its practical implications. The calculations 
here show that more often than not, it is likely to be wrong 
if a declaration is made that a treatment is ineffective when 
the outcome is positive, but does not achieve p≤0.05.  This 
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conclusion is reached using only statistical analysis. No account 
is taken of the fact that in all cases there was enough  prior 
information from science or commonsense to suspect the 
treatment would be effective, and so warrant an RCT. As 
in much of EBM, the analysis here comes to its conclusion 
using frequentist statistics, free of any a priori reasoning. 
Unfortunately, with the limited amount of data collected, the 
different approaches used in this paper indicate considerable 
uncertainty about the estimate of the (conditional) negative 
predictive value. However, looking at the estimates collated in 
result summary section and the discussion above on model 
limitations, it would not be unreasonable to summarise by 
stating that as a best guess, when outcomes are positive but 
p>0.05, there is a probability of perhaps 2/3 that the treatment 
is indeed effective.
The implication is, that leaving aside the costs of errors 
(or assuming the cost of Type I and II errors are equal [10]), 
EBM seems too conservative in its assessment of RCTs. A 
conservative approach may be reasonable to limit over-
enthusiastic acceptance of new treatments where there 
are commercial pressures and a likelihood of publication 
bias together with a high financial cost and possibly a high 
cost in terms of side effects [15]. The same approach seems 
inappropriate when it is used to reject established treatments 
supported by conventional wisdom and with clear mechanisms 
of action. The case of the rejection of basic principles of 
hygiene for injections discussed in the introduction [3], is in 
this author’s opinion, just one of numerous examples of very 
low cost treatments where the occasional benefit is certainly 
worthwhile, but where the treatment has been inappropriately 
rejected by EBM. 
Whether it is reasonable to decide to act as though a 
treatment is ineffective, should depend not only on p-value 
calculations but also on prior knowledge, some estimate of the 
relative costs of Type I and Type II errors and a synthesis of all 
these factors. The purpose of this paper is to argue for a wiser 
use of statistics in medicine. In the absence of a full decision 
theory analysis of each treatment in medicine, this paper is 
an argument for EBM to be modified so that, particularly for 
treatments where commercial pressures are not relevant, 
wisdom and mechanism is accorded more status.
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